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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, 3d Edition. 2 vols. By
David M. O'Brien.t New York, New York: W.W. Norton &
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I. INTRODUCTION
Political scientist Jerry Goldman recently challenged public law
scholars to "reexamine the fundamentals of constitutional law" and
consider whether political scientists should agree on a "canon''1 that
would guide the pedagogical use of constitutional law casebooks
employed in the field.2 In evaluating twelve casebooks that (in his
estimation) represent "a substantial segment of the 100,000 or so
[undergraduate] students who likely enroll in constitutional law classes"
annually, Goldman suggests that the lack of a guiding canon prevents
political scientists from adequately defending the choices they make in
adopting a text and teaching a constitutional law course from the social
science perspective.'
While Professor Goldman correctly acknowledges the contempo-
rary diversity of the "great public law tradition in political science," 4
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of Akron; B.A. 1980, University
of Connecticut; J.D. 1984, University of Dayton School of Law; Ph.D. 1995, University of
Virginia.
1. Goldman defines "canon" as "a widely accepted body of rules, principles, and norms
exemplified in a common set of Supreme Court opinions." Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of
Constitutional Law? 10 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 134 (1992) <http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/
subpages/reviews/goldman2.htm>.
2. Id. at 137.
3. Id.
4. The public law tradition, which includes the subfields of constitutional law, administra-
tive law, international law, and jurisprudence, gradually disintegrated as scholars embraced the
principles underlying Sociological and Legal Realist thought (i.e., that law cannot be understood
apart from its social context). This trend, in part, not only widened the chasm between legal
studies and political science, but also made "traditional" constitutional law the "chief
representative of legal studies in modern political science." HARRY P. STUrMPF, AMERICAN
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his suggestion that working from a homogenous list of cases ought to
be a priority for professors teaching constitutional law is questionable.
What Goldman suggests is not only impracticable, but also ignores the
reality that political science and legal study are inherently different
academic enterprises. Indeed, the eclecticism of constitutional law
scholarship and its utilization of social science techniques to study
political behavior is a distinctive element of the public law subfield.
Moreover, from a social science perspective, reducing constitutional law
to a rote list of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine is unwise because it over-
emphasizes legal doctrine at the expense of understanding judicial
policy making and its vital historical and political context. The
selection of any constitutional law textbook by a political scientist,
therefore, should tend to celebrate, and not to disparage, what makes
political science preeminent: that law is really a function of politics.s
Yet, asserting that all constitutional law is "politics" is too
simplistic and does little to explain the dynamics of casebook selection
in political science. The selection of a casebook is a decision implicat-
ing a variety of pedagogical concerns that affect how constitutional law
is taught in the classroom. While not an exhaustive list, these
considerations include: (1) an analysis of the state of the public law
subfield; (2) the professional training of the instructor; (3) the scope of
coverage of the casebook and its intended application to undergraduate
political science classes; and, (4) an evaluation of the casebook and its
effectiveness in a public law course. Whereas the first two consider-
ations deal with casebook selection, the remaining two affect the way
in which the text is an extension and affirmation of the professor's
teaching philosophy, style, and preference.
This Review first describes the importance of each consideration
by analyzing how a two-volume constitutional law casebook,6 written
JUDICIAL POLITICS 18 (2d ed. 1998). For this reason, for purposes of this essay, reference to the
"public law subfield" is intended to encompass political scientists engaged in the study of
constitutional law.
5. Unlike its more radical connotation that is epitomized by the tenets of Critical Legal
Studies, STUMPF, supra note 4, at 34-36, this argument conceptualizes the study of law and
courts, or judicial politics (of which constitutional law is a part), as "political jurisprudence."
Generally, political jurisprudence rejects legal positivism and assumes that courts are political
agencies that are part of the larger political process. Id. at 21. See generally Harry P. Stumpf et
al., Whither Political Jurisprudence: A Symposium, 36 W. POL. Q. 533-69 (1983).
6. 1 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR
POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY (3rd ed. 1997) explores separation of powers,
federalism, and the electoral process. The second volume, 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (3d ed. 1997) concerns the
protection of civil rights and liberties in a system of limited government. Notably, Professor
O'Brien annually updates the material in each volume through his analysis of the Court's most
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by Professor David M. O'Brien of the Woodrow Wilson Department
of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, can
be admirably employed to teach the principle that constitutional law is,
in fact, politics. Overall, the volumes are excellent undergraduate
political science constitutional law texts. However, the casebook
volumes have two flaws. First, they do not address the vital question
of "what is political science?," a query that ought to be routinely asked
by anyone teaching public law courses. Second, they omit sufficient
explanation of the fundamentals of conducting legal research and
writing, including citation style. These criticisms are explored in more
detail in the Review's concluding section.
II. THE PEDAGOGICAL DECISION TO ADOPT (AND THEN USE)
A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TEXT
Political science professors teaching constitutional law classes enjoy
a wide range of choices in confronting the decision of which book to
adopt. In 1992, twelve casebooks (including O'Brien's) were identified
by Professor Goldman as texts commonly used by political scientists.
7
Recent or noteworthy entries into the public law subfield also include
several other texts that were not part of Goldman's analysis.8 With
recent term in DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH.
7. Excluding the O'Brien casebooks, an updated version of this list includes the following
texts: LUCIUS J. BARKER & TWILEY W. BARKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION:
CASES AND COMMENTARIES (6th ed. 1990); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1992); CRAIG R.
DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (6th ed. 1996); LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G.
WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA, 2 volumes, (3d ed. 1997);
LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1995); SHELDON GOLDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ESSAYS (2d ed. 1991); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997); JAMES C. FOSTER & SUSAN M.
LEESON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT, (1998); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART,
YALE KAMISAR, JESSE H. CHOPER, & STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (8th ed. 1996); ROBERT J. STEAMER & RICHARD J. MAIMAN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTION AND CASE STUDIES (1991); GEOFFREY
R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 1996). Goldman, supra, note 1, at 134-5.
One text, RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND INTERPRETATIONS (4th ed. 1995), was not reviewed by Goldman but is the subject
of an independent case book review (by Dr. Patricia Pauly) by the Law and Court Section of the
American Political Science Association. See Susan Gluck Mezey, Introduction, in LAW & POL.
BOOK REV. 121-33 (1992) <http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/mezey2.htm>.
8. THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (1997); RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (1997); WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES
E. FLEMING, & SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2d ed.
1995); ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND
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so many alternatives at hand, the fledgling or seasoned professor makes
an adoption decision that is invariably idiosyncratic but that still fairly
represents the professor's own professional experience when the
Constitutional Law course is taught. Less experienced instructors
probably draw heavily upon graduate training to select a casebook,
especially in their first teaching position. Book selection is affected by
whether the young professor (as a graduate student) was under the
tutelage of a respected senior faculty member. If so, the decision to
adopt may be as simple as whether the new professor is familiar with
a textbook that is published by a mentor.
Still, it is reasonable to think that a choice of the textbook may
involve more introspective analysis about what kind of political scientist
the young scholar wishes to be when entering the profession. In those
instances, a basic pedagogical factor carrying almost presumptive
weight in the adoption decision is the answer to the question: "What
is political science?" For the constitutional law teacher, this inquiry
can be restated as: "What is public law?" Both queries provide a
point of departure for acquiring a sense about the state of the discipline
that, in turn, becomes instrumental in casebook choice and the
formulation of a coherent pedagogical approach to public law instruc-
tion.
A. What Is Public Law?
Defining modern "public law" begins with what the state of this
subfield looked like before and after (roughly) the 1950s and 1960s.
Prior to that time, public law was an amalgam of disciplines that
loosely fell under the larger subject matter of American politics, public
administration, and international relations. 9  Yet, because judicial
studies had a distinctly legalistic and formalistic approach that was
preoccupied with the U.S. Supreme Court and constitutional law, it
was a relatively isolated academic enterprise that never quite fit into
the political science mainstream. Cross-discipline and comparative
investigations were rare and pertinent studies within the field had a
legal bias and a fixation on the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, by
emphasizing "all things legal," constitutional law pedagogy in political
science tended to be more traditional, normative, and descriptive.'"
CIVIL RIGHTS (1995).
9. Martin M. Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE
STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 366-81 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993).
10. Id. at 365-66. See also STUMPF, supra note 4, at 3-27. The most analogous modem-
day approach to the traditional one is what some scholars label the "jurisprudence of values." Id.
at 36-38, 43-44.
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For a variety of reasons, however, including some that are
jurisprudential," the scope and direction of the subfield began to
change in the 1960s. For one thing, its core became much more
diverse and, in some quarters, took on more of an antilegalistic and less
formalistic hue. Behavioralist scholars, in particular, were dissatisfied
with the controlling legal paradigm in public law and increasingly
focused their attention on making quantitative explanations for judicial
decisions. Hence new research centered on examining (among other
things) court outputs, judges' attitudes, judicial impact, organizational
influences, institutional constraints, and policy preferences. 2 Despite
the "outward and downward" movement of the public law subfield
away from its constitutional law and Supreme Court moorings and the
resultant increasing pluralism (in subject matter) over the years,' 3 the
current pedagogy remains sequestered from the mainstream 4 and is
still very traditional for many.' Therefore, from a methodological
standpoint, in one fundamental respect (at least since the 1950s) the
subfield has become a house divided against itself: many scholars
endorse the traditional approach to public law while others are
committed to seeking empirical answers to research questions.'
6
11. Stumpf, supra note 4, at 3-31.
12. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Politics: Still A Distinctive Field, in POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 189, 190-95 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983).
13. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 376-77.
14. Kim Lane Scheppele, Political Science and Legal Studies: The Casefor Dualism, 1 LAW
& CTs. NEWSL. 9 (Spring 1996).
15. See STUMPF, supra note 4, at 19; Stumpf et al., supra note 5, at 535 (commentary by
Stumpf).
16. Stumpf et al., supra note 5, at 536-37 (commentary by Stumpf); Martin Shapiro,
Political Jurisprudence, 52 KY. L.J. 294, 309 (1964) (observing that "political scientists have for
some years been engaged in a great debate between behaviorists and non- or antibehaviorists").
This division is characterized by a variety of labels (traditional, descriptive, normative,
nonbehavioral versus empirical, behavioral, quantitative, realist). The essential idea, though, is
best captured by conceptualizing the competing methodological positions as endorsing either a
"qualitative" or a "quantitative" approach to the study of law and courts. A sample of pertinent
literature reveals that this debate (however it is correctly labeled) continues to thrive in the context
of whether "new institutionalism" is a coherent methodology that can unify the public law
subfield by reconciling the descriptive and empirical elements pertaining to the study of law and
courts. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The 'New Institutionalism,' and the
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 101-07 (1988); Howard Gillman, The New
Institutionalism, Part I, LAW & CTS. NEWSL. 6 (Winter 1996-97); Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,
The New Institutionalism, Part II, LAW & CTs. NEWSL. 4 (Spring 1997); Howard Gillman,
Placing Judicial Motives in Context: A Response to Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, LAW & CTS.
NEWSL. 10 (Spring 1997); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, A Postscript from Epstein and Knight, L.
& CTS. NEWSL. 13 (Spring 1997); David Walden Levin, Comment: Building a Bridge Between
Attitude and Institution, Preference and Precedent, LAW & CTs. NEWSL. 7 (Winter 1997-98).
Seattle University Law Review
This internal division is really a continuing debate about what is
the best method to study judicial politics. 7 In both his earlier
essays18 and in his provocative 1993 essay on the state of the disci-
pline,19 political scientist Martin Shapiro reenergized public law by
implying that the subfield would never reach respectability as a
distinctive entity unless its membership mostly aligned itself with the
behavioralist side of the discipline. The traditional approach to courts,
Shapiro insinuates, is too value-laden to be meaningful because it
myopically centers on using legal doctrine as the touchstone to explain
judicial behavior. This predisposition, Shapiro fears, trivializes the
study of law and courts within political science by reducing public law
scholars to role-playing the part of the "little law professor" for
undergraduates in the classroom. Thus, Shapiro fears the subfield is
robbed of its own unique identity and is perpetually kept at the
margins of the profession.2" While some disagree with Shapiro's
assessment,2' there is strong evidence that the internal conflict in
political science continues unabated.22 Indeed, in saying that the
"study of Supreme Court decision making has reached a critical point,"
one public law scholar claims that it is "imperative to reconcile the
resurgence of institutionalism with the attitudinal perspective."23
Restated, some feel it is essential to bridge the gap between descriptive
and empirical social science study.
This background about the state of the discipline is significant
because the constitutional law teacher invariably makes a decision to
adopt a text after considering the methodological predilection of a
casebook's author. A text featuring mostly cases and descriptive
accounts of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making in the political
17. Michael McCann, Its Only Law and Courts: But I Like It, LAW & CTs. NEWSL. 6
(Spring 1996). See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL xv (1993) (suggesting that historical, anecdotal, legalistic, tendentious, or
doctrinal study of Supreme Court behavior is not scientific enough to be called political science).
See generally STUMPF, supra note 4, at 22-24.
18. Shapiro, supra note 16; Stumpf, et al., supra note 5.
19. Shapiro, supra note 9.
20. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 376-77; Stumpf, et al., supra note 5, at 543 (commentary by
Shapiro). See also McCann, supra note 17, at 7 (arguing that Shapiro's scholarship on political
jurisprudence "tends to privilege work in the tradition of realist-behavioral empirical study").
21. See generally McCann, supra note 17.
22. The judicial behavioralists appear to control the literature. See Thomas R. Hensley &
Ashlyn Kuersten, Studying the Studies: An Assessment of Judicial Politics Research in Four Major
Political Science Journals, 1960-1995, LAW & CTS. NEWSL. 14 (Spring 1996-97) (reporting that
67% of literature in leading political science journals was quantitatively oriented over past 36
years). The debate thrives in the Law and Courts section of the American Political Science
Association. See, e.g., supra note 16.
23. Levin, supra note 16, at 7.
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process is likely to be chosen by someone who prefers to instruct in the
traditional mode. Similarly, one inclined to favor quantitative methods
probably wants a casebook that includes both legal doctrine and an
appreciation for utilizing scientific explanations (and not simply
descriptive or normative accounts) of the Court's work.
A cursory examination of Professor O'Brien's publication
record 4 and his constitutional law texts reveal that his scholarship is
oriented toward traditional constitutional law study. 5 Specifically,
O'Brien assumes in his two-volume constitutional law set that
"constitutional law, history, and politics are intimately intertwined."26
Thus, both volumes rely upon the description of constitutional history
and key political events to make the legal decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court comprehensible and politically relevant.
Three central features of the set reinforce this point well. First,
the beginning chapter of each text contains an insightful discussion of
the origins (and controversial application) of judicial review and, more
significantly, the politics of constitutional interpretation. This latter
topic is critical because O'Brien uses it to demonstrate that the cases
of the High Court make little sense without an understanding of how
the justices construe text by what he calls "constitutional choices. '"27
"Interpreting the Constitution," in other words, "presupposes a judicial
and political philosophy and poses inescapable questions of substantive
value choices." 28  He adds, "[i]nterpretivists, no less than noninter-
pretivists, cannot evade making basic constitutional choices in their
conceptions and formulations of the underlying principles of constitu-
tional provisions."" Early on, then, O'Brien challenges students to
think of the Constitution as a political document that is shaped by
value-laden choices imposed by justices holding specific judicial
philosophies.3 ° Given that the core subject matter of the cases is not
presented until after rival theories of judicial interpretation are
24. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (4th ed. 1995); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, WHAT PROCESS Is DUE?: COURTS AND
SCIENCE-POLICY DISPUTES (1987); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1981).
25. Other political scientists concur. See STUMPF, supra note 4, at 43; Stumpf et al., supra
note 5, at 543 (commentary by Shapiro).
26. 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at xv.
27. 2 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 83.
28. 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 90.
29. Id. at 84.
30. While some textbooks afford considerable attention to explaining various methods of
constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., MURPHY, ET AL., supra note 8, others give the topic very
little printed space. See, e.g., FOSTER & LEESON, supra note 7.
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explained, the emphasis on justices making constitutional choices is a
central organizing principle of the O'Brien volumes. 1
The large number of edited cases included in both texts is the
second aspect undergirding O'Brien's traditional style that features
court opinions in historical and political context. In his 1992 analysis
of twelve casebooks, Goldman reports that O'Brien's first edition text
(both volumes) contained the most cases (211) of the twelve.3 In
1997, O'Brien's third edition boasts 231 edited cases (80 in Volume 1
and 151 in Volume 2). 3 While some have criticized Volume Two for
containing too much material,34 O'Brien clearly sees the book's length
as an asset because it promotes greater flexibility for the instructor in
assigning cases; and it gives students a ready resource for additional
study beyond a course's minimum requirements.35 Suffice it to say
that O'Brien clearly errs on the side of more rather than less in his
quest to expose students to case opinions that provide a sense of what
constitutional doctrine, standing alone, represents. More significantly,
this calculation indirectly hammers home the point that the case
method of instruction, which is very much a staple of legal education,
also has a primary role in the political study of constitutional law.
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the O'Brien books, though,
is what they omit. Unlike other casebooks written by political
scientists that incorporate a behavioralist approach into their writing,36
O'Brien conspicuously avoids any mention of quantitative explanations
for judicial behavior either in the text or, to a lesser extent, in the
selected bibliography accompanying each chapter. Whereas some
authors couch the judicial process and Supreme Court decision making
in terms of statistical models of legal and extralegal behavior,37
O'Brien sticks to the more conventional view that constitutional law is
a political process informed by key historical and sociological happen-
ings. As he reminds us:
31. Presumably it is by design, too, that O'Brien made the editorial decision to present
students with a full rendition of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights before the first
chapter on judicial review and constitutional politics. Most other texts relegate these documents
to an appendix in the back (and not the front) of the casebook. The decision makes a subtle but
effective point that any interpretation of the document (political or otherwise) must proceed from
the words the Framers committed to paper. See O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 3-23.
32. Goldman, supra note 1, at 137.
33. O'BRIEN, supra note 6. Cases that were consolidated were counted as a single case.
Cases appearing in parentheses and "reprise" cases were not counted.
34. Judith A. Baer, Constitutional Law and Politics, 10 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 161-2
(1992) <http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/obrien.htm>.
35. 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at xvi.
36. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 7.
37. See, e.g., HENSLEY, ET AL., supra note 8.
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The Supreme Court's decisions do not occur in a political vacuum,
standing apart from history and the political struggles within the
Court and the country. Virtually every major political controversy
raises questions of constitutional law, no less than do technological
changes and social movements and economic forces.3"
O'Brien reinforces this message in the supplemental material
surrounding the introductory text (preceding the edited cases) and the
cases. Instead of using visual graphs or tables ordinarily found in more
quantitative social science research,39 O'Brien chooses to rely upon
"Development of the Law," "Constitutional History," "Inside the
Court," or "In Comparative Perspective" boxes that alternately use
descriptive statistics, primary judicial or historical source documents,
or author-generated narrative that tend to be from the author's own
research efforts. 4
In the end, O'Brien answers the question of "what is public law?"
by portraying constitutional law as the aggregation of political history,
legal doctrine, and social movements, all the stuff of traditional
constitutional law scholarship. For O'Brien, the Court's work is highly
political. But his explanations on what is political are not scientifically
based, at least in the empirical sense. Consequently, the quantitative,
realist study of public law, it seems, has an insignificant role in
O'Brien's constitutional law paradigm. Instead, O'Brien's pedagogical
approach is defined by an "old-fashioned" kind of scholarship that
shares a key assumption from the sociological component of political
jurisprudence: that the Supreme Court makes law as a part of the
governing political society.4'
B. The Impact of Professional Training
The professional training and research interests of the social
scientist are closely connected with how constitutional law is taught in
the classroom. Those teaching public law in all likelihood have one or
two graduate degrees that specialize in legal studies: a J.D. or a Ph.D.
or both." Although there are probably exceptions, it is unlikely that
38. 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at xv.
39. See, e.g., HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 84-89 (using block voting analysis).
40. See, e.g., 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at xvii-xviii, 108-09, 111-12, 157-59, 160.
41. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 294-5; Stumpf et al., supra note 5, at 543 (commentary
by Shapiro).
42. See AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF UNDERGRADU-
ATE POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY (1996-98). A cursory examination of this directory supports
this statement because some departments have faculty with a J.D. (as the highest terminal degree)
teaching public law courses. See, e.g., id., at 63 (listing two J.D. professors at Morehead State
1998] 1011
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teachers with only a law degree will use the same type of casebook that
a teacher with only a Ph.D. will utilize. The reasons are fairly
intuitive.
A person with a J.D. is taught by a formal casebook method of
Socratic instruction that does not dwell on the political nature of law.
Usually the law student does not have advanced training in quantita-
tive methods because those types of courses are not an integral part of
law school. Apart from perhaps using it as a way to present evidence
in an advanced trial procedures class, quantitative analysis is superflu-
ous because it is not necessary in routine legal research or for
understanding the substantive content of positive or common law.
Moreover, a law student is trained to write argumentative papers that
rely upon adept application of precise legal principles and statutes in
diverse hypothetical factual circumstances. With the exception of legal
writing or clinical classes, a law student is tested at the end of the
semester by writing an essay examination that puts a premium on
"issue-spotting" and legal analysis. Notably, too, at the end of the
three-year period of legal instruction, the law student is not required
to pass a set of oral or written comprehensive examinations in specific
subfields of expertise.43 Nor is a law student required to write a
manuscript or dissertation that is considered by a faculty to be an
original contribution to relevant legal literature. Therefore, in the law
school setting (where the focus is teaching students to "think and write
like a lawyer") law students usually are not exposed to the regular
utilization of quantitative methods in legal research; and they are not
customarily acquainted with the multitude of extra-legal factors that
make the law contextual and politically dynamic for the Ph.D
student."
A Ph.D., on the other hand, is a degree very distinct from the
J.D. Although a constitutional law casebook is used in the Ph.D.
classroom setting, the graduate student in political science is not
routinely trained with the Socratic method. In fact, since much of the
University). It is unclear how often political science departments hire faculty with both degrees,
however, because the directory only lists the highest terminal degree achieved by individual
faculty.
43. By way of comparison, as part of my Ph.D. training I took written examinations in
Constitutional Law and Theory; Jurisprudence; National Institutions; and Modem Political
Theory. Satisfactory performance on these tests was required (along with an oral defense of a
dissertation proposal) before I could begin to write a dissertation.
44. There is disagreement, however, on the extent to which law schools remain anchored
in the doctrinal study of cases and whether they offer political explanations for the law's
development. Compare Stumpf, et al., supra note 5, at 534-41 with Stumpf et al., supra note 5,
at 541-48.
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class work leading up to the dissertation is done in a small-class
seminar format where in-class discussion is relatively uninhibited, the
graduate student is probably prone to ask more questions than the
instructor. Discovering legal issues and "thinking like a lawyer" is
beside the point as well because most graduate students are principally
evaluated by how well they conduct social science research and how
well they write lengthy graduate papers using a variety of legal and
nonlegal sources. Furthermore, quantitative method instruction is an
active part of graduate social science training because Ph.D. students
actually incorporate it into their research designs; thus, essay examina-
tion performance at the end of the term is not cultivated. Moreover,
in order to receive a Ph.D., the graduate student must complete several
years of classroom training and, after passing a variety of subfield or
comprehensive examinations, successfully complete and defend (in
front of a faculty committee) a dissertation relating to some aspect of
political behavior.
In short, the instructor with a Ph.D. is more likely to be equipped
with the methodological training (and concomitant research agenda)
that makes political science an empirical science or more of a highly
sophisticated descriptive enterprise (depending upon how they answer
the "what is public law?" question). For this reason, after receiving
the degree, the public law scholar is more receptive to teaching from
a text containing extensive political explanations for judicial behavior.
It is probably rare indeed that a political scientist would want to adopt
a casebook that, for one reason or another, is perceived to be too
legalistic and not having enough political science content.4
Accordingly, unless they are expecting a behavioralist perspective,
social science scholars adopting O'Brien's constitutional law text will
not be disappointed by its lack of political analysis. While legally-
trained public law scholars without a Ph.D. might object to (or be
unfamiliar with) O'Brien's pedagogy, they probably would appreciate
the historical context of the case discussions along with the general
selection of case law presented in the text. Ironically, political
scientists might find the text deficient because it does not refer to
empirical judicial studies or because it uses too many cases. Yet the
lawyer without a Ph.D. will favor the legal aspects of the manuscript
and enjoy O'Brien's discussion of the Court's judicial politics because
45. See, e.g., Joseph F. Kobylka, Constitutional Law, 10 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 151-52
(1992) <http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/gunther.htm> (observing that "[w]hat keeps
[Kobylka] from [adopting an earlier version of the Gunther and Sullivan text, supra note 7] is the
essentially legalistic structure of the work, a structure that too frequently obscures the extent of
the political nature of the Court in the American system of governance").
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it is something they are not used to seeing in law school casebooks. As
a result, the constitutional law teacher's professional training influences
the casebook decision. Perhaps the litmus test for its pedagogical use,
however, is how it is employed in the undergraduate classroom-the
topic of the next section.
C. Scope of Coverage and Use of the Constitutional Law Casebook
in an Undergraduate Class
Whereas the adoption of a constitutional law casebook greatly
depends on the political science professor's graduate training and self-
awareness of the state of the discipline, the professor's pedagogical use
of the text is a function of personal teaching philosophy, style, and
preference. As an assistant professor of political science, I design my
courses with the intent of achieving four generic objectives to promote
my students' intellectual growth. First, students must learn to be
prepared, in and out of class. Second, they must work hard and be
challenged by the reading material and lecture presentations. Third,
they must learn how to think critically by researching and writing
papers that involve complex issues of constitutional law and public
policy. Fourth, it is essential that they discover how to refine their
ideas through oral participation in class. In general, each teaching
objective epitomizes a theme of "learning how to learn." It is my hope
that by giving students the opportunity to read, write, and think
critically about political and legal issues that define the day (and that
inevitably will be useful for post-graduation employment), they will
develop the requisite skills to meet their potential.
The revised syllabi reprinted in Appendices A and B illustrate
how O'Brien's Constitutional Law and Politics assists in accomplishing
the pedagogical goals for undergraduate instruction in a two-semester
academic year. I typically use the first volume in the fall semester in
"The Supreme Court and Constitutional Law" (Appendix A).46 The
second volume is adopted for the spring and applies to a civil liberties
course called "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties" (Appendix B).
Although the substantive content of each course is different, my
teaching approach is similar in that I try to connect the course work to
two basic questions: (1) how do Supreme Court justices interpret the
Constitution politically?; and (2) as an unelected, life-tenured institu-
tion, what is the "proper" judicial role of the Supreme Court in the
46. Some professors argue that the civil rights constitutional law course should be taught
first. See Scott D. Gerber, Reordering American Constitutional Law Teaching, in POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND POLITICS 702-705 (1994).
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American political system? These questions represent contextual
themes that highlight the judicial politics of the Supreme Court that,
not surprisingly, coincide with O'Brien's pedagogy.
Because the fall course is not a formal prerequisite for the spring
class, the material presented in the first three weeks of each class is
identical. Both courses begin with an introduction to the Supreme
Court and its present membership; an explanation of how to brief cases
and conduct legal research; and a description of how judicial review
developed, and how it is exercised politically through different judicial
philosophies. The third edition of the O'Brien text facilitates the
completion of many, but not all, of these primary tasks. Each volume
has a copy of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights; a biographi-
cal description of the current Court and a listing of its membership
historically; a handy legal glossary of legal terms; an index of cases; a
comprehensive historical and political narrative preceding each set of
edited cases; a selected bibliography for additional reading in each
section of the book; and, notably, an excellent discussion of judicial
review and its application through competing judicial philosophies and
the politics of constitutional interpretation.47
Because I treat the fall course as an informal prerequisite for the
spring Civil Liberties class, an additional two weeks is spent in the
first portion of the fall semester to explain Supreme Court jurisdiction,
the concepts of justiciability and "access policy-making," and the
specific decisional processes (and impact) of the Court. Admittedly,
this approach is problematic because this material is not covered in the
spring semester in order to give attention to a larger breadth of civil
rights and liberties decisions included in Volume Two. Because this
material is omitted, students who did not take the fall course are
deprived of that key material; but if this material is included, spring
students are denied complete coverage of substantive cases in civil
47. Though the O'Brien text covers the basics of how to find Supreme Court deci-
sions-and, with the latest edition, contains a helpful discussion on using the Internet to locate
and use law-based websites-it does not offer any substantial aid to students wanting to learn how
to brief cases or how to perform legal research. See, e.g., 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 29 ("How
to Locate Decisions of the Supreme Court"), and at 177 ("How to Locate Supreme Court
Decisions and Other Law-Related Materials on the Internet"). Only a few casebooks include this
type of study help. See, e.g., FOSTER & LEESON, supra note 7, at 36-37 (discussing how to brief
cases). As a result, I find it necessary to supplement the text with more instruction that gives
students the opportunity to learn about legal research and citation. Specifically, in addition to
requiring that students view an introductory video on Supreme Court history and attend a tour
of the University's law library, students are given comprehensive handouts that explain how to
brief cases, conduct legal research, and accomplish legal (and nonlegal) citation. Moreover, the
syllabus (along with class instruction) introduces students to using the Internet for legal research.
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rights and liberties. Perhaps this is the sort of teaching dilemma that
Professor Judith Baer foresaw when she criticized the length of Volume
Two.48 To be sure, then, at least sometimes the sheer size of the text
unintentionally forces professors to make undesirable choices in
organizing the structure of a Constitutional Law course, especially if
both volumes are adopted in one academic year.
An interesting feature of the O'Brien casebook, however, is the
fairly unusual decision to incorporate topics that other casebooks ignore
or minimize in analogous two-volume sets that isolate separation of
powers material from cases covering individual rights. In addition to
covering the usual cases on federalism and the political struggle for
power between national institutions, in Volume One O'Brien devotes
the last chapter to investigating the Supreme Court's role in superin-
tending the electoral process. Given that this topic ordinarily appears,
if at all, in books dealing with civil rights, O'Brien's decision to treat
it in Volume One is unique and refreshing.49 Pedagogically, the
choice is defensible. As O'Brien reminds us, questions of representa-
tion, voting rights, and electoral politics not only raise issues of
equality, but also of the basic structural concerns of a democratic
government, such as accountability, federalism, and majority rule.5"
Furthermore, how the Court deals with reapportionment, patronage,
and campaign finance is inherently a political issue that forces students
to assess the normative issue of whether the Court ought to be active
in this area of the law.
In terms of case coverage, O'Brien also takes some unconventional
steps in Volume Two, the larger civil liberties and rights text. Two
come readily to mind. First, unlike most other typical casebooks,"1
Volume Two comprehensively outlines the rights of the accused.
While a few two-volume sets written by political scientists discuss
cases pertaining to the exclusionary rule and to self-incrimination, 2
O'Brien also includes cases on the Fourth Amendment's automobile
exception to the warrants requirement, administrative searches,
electronic eavesdropping, plea bargaining, the right to an impartial jury
48. Baer, supra note 34, at 162.
49. See, e.g., HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 661-65 (addressing voting rights); EPSTEIN
& WALKER, supra note 7, at 756-803 (discussing voting rights and political representation).
50. 1 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 711.
51. Mezey, supra note 7, at 132 (noting that there is tacit agreement among authors to not
include criminal procedure cases).
52. HENSLEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 419-510. See generally EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra
note 7.
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trial, and capital punishment.5 3 Another innovation is O'Brien's
consideration of cases dealing with economic rights, a topic not usually
handled by other civil rights and liberties' texts. The scope of
economic liberty is first detailed in the Court's Contracts Clause
jurisprudence. Then, in the context of substantive due process and the
Court's alleged activism in protecting lassiez-faire economic philoso-
phy, O'Brien explores the origins and implications of the Lochner
era."4 The logical extension of this discussion is brought up to date
by analyzing the Court's contemporary approach in expanding an
individual's property rights in the area of Fifth Amendment takings.5"
Presenting criminal and property rights' cases in this fashion provides
students with a perspective of the Court's work that is neglected in
other constitutional law casebooks.
Overall, the subject matter of both volumes is challenging enough
to meet applicable teaching objectives and expectations of students who
wish to learn the intricacies of constitutional law over two semesters.
The conventional material usually found in a first semester course is
covered well: Volume One has landmark cases like the Steel Seizure
opinion, 6 the Prize cases,5 7 and the legislative veto ruling," which
teach students that competing judicial philosophies transform the
separation of powers principle into a vital but recurring public policy
issue for an evolving constitutional democracy. Volume Two, on the
other hand, includes key cases on the Court's approach to controversial
political issues that implicate the freedom of speech 9 and religion,6"
the right to privacy, 61 and affirmative action. 62  The careful study of
these cases and others entice dedicated students to work hard and
prepare for class. Moreover, by analyzing individual liberty and the
political relationships existing among principal governmental institu-
tions, students learn the art of critical thinking, which also assists them
in writing research papers. And, because participation in class is
required through "oral briefing," students are compelled to think
extemporaneously. In sum, the O'Brien constitutional law casebooks
53. See 2 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 770-1130.
54. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); 2 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 245-77.
55. 2 O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 278-87.
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
57. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
58. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
59. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning).
60. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(free exercise).
61. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion).
62. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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are the foundation for making students familiar with the art of
"learning how to learn."
D. The Success of the O'Brien Casebook in Teaching
Public Law Courses
Constitutional law may be fun to teach, but it is also tough to
learn. Consequently, the pedagogical use of a casebook necessarily
involves a continuous reassessment of whether it succeeds in matching
the learning expectations of both the instructor and the student.
Ideally, for the student the text should be informative but not
daunting. With the professor's help, it should also convey the idea
that the Court is a political institution that routinely makes law and
public policy. Naturally, the casebook must fulfill both aims compe-
tently because doing so establishes (at least indirectly) that the students
are receptive to absorbing the complex material that makes up a public
law course.
One measure for evaluating the success of the O'Brien texts in the
classroom is the extent to which students either enjoy or dislike using
it. On the standardized form (SIR, or Student Instructional Report)
employed at the University of Akron to evaluate faculty teaching, one
question asks students to rate the quality of the textbook. The results
compiled from the SIR indicate that a majority of students found the
casebook used in the Supreme Court and Constitutional Law course
(Volume One) "excellent" or "good."6 3 Volume Two received similar
results in its application to the Civil Rights and Liberties course.64
In addition to recording their feelings about the course on the
standardized form, students also had the choice to complete a
supplemental form that gives more feedback about the way in which
the course was taught.65  The answers to two questions that directly
63. Volume One was adopted in the spring 1996, fall 1996, and fall 1997 semesters. For
the Spring 1996 (N=17), forty-seven percent rated it "excellent"; thirty-five percent said it was
"good"; twelve percent stated it was "satisfactory"; six percent deemed it "fair;" and zero percent
rated it "poor." For the Fall 1996 (N=19), forty-seven percent rated Volume One "excellent";
forty-two percent said it was "good"; five percent stated it was "satisfactory"; five percent deemed
it "fair;" and zero percent rated it "poor." 1996 SIR (fall and spring) (on file with author). The
Fall 1997 SIR was not available and is excluded from the analysis.
64. Volume Two was adopted in the spring 1996 and spring 1997. For the spring 1996
(N=20), forty-five percent rated it "excellent"; forty percent said it was "good"; ten percent stated
it was "satisfactory"; zero percent deemed it "fair;" and zero percent rated it "poor." For the
spring 1997 (N=31), forty-five percent rated it "excellent"; thirty-two percent said it was "good";
sixteen percent stated it was "satisfactory"; zero percent deemed it "fair;" and three percent rated
it "poor." 1996 and 1997 SIR (spring semesters) (on file with author).
65. The answers to these questions give more student feedback because they allow the
students to write down their impressions in narrative form. With the exception of the summer
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ask about the strengths and weaknesses of the assigned texts66 provide
sufficient evidence that the O'Brien casebook meets the academic
expectations of students enrolled in both constitutional law courses.
For example, an analysis of student responses relative to Volume One
reveals that most students reacted positively to the text by commenting
that it was informative and easy to understand." Similar findings
were obtained for Volume Two. Specifically, most students using the
civil liberties text thought it was a good book, and a fair proportion of
students believed it was thorough and comprehensible.6" Of course,
these latter findings are limited in scope due to their sample size and
the way they were unscientifically derived and interpreted. Even so,
in conjunction with the SIR data, the findings give ample proof that
the O'Brien texts are favorably received by students and, more
importantly, that there is little compelling evidence to conclude that
their adoption is not warranted or is counter-productive.
course evaluations (where an additional question is asked about overall satisfaction of the course),
they are: (1) What do you think were the best aspects, or. strengths, of this course?; (2) What do
you think were the worst aspects, or weaknesses, of this course?; (3) What do you think were the
best aspects, or strengths, of the books assigned in this course?; (4) What do you think were the
worst aspects, or weaknesses, of the books assigned in this course?; and, (5) How do you think
the educational value of the course can be improved? 1996 and 1997 Supplemental Course
Evaluations (spring and fall semesters) (on file with author).
66. See supra note 65.
67. In the spring 1996 (N=15) and Fall 1997 (N=18) courses, of 33 students who completed
the narrative evaluation, 29 answered question number three, supra note 65, and 21 answered
question number four, supra note 65. Not surprisingly, all those who answered number three (or
one hundred percent) made favorable comments about the book; but, of those students answering
question number four, only 12, or fifty-seven percent, criticized some aspect of it or offered a
suggestion for improvement. Despite the biased wording of question number four, then, forty-
three percent presumably did not find anything wrong with the text. Moreover, 11 of the 29
students answering question number three (or thirty-eight percent) thought the text was either
clear or easy to understand; and seven (or twenty-four percent) opined it was informative or
thorough. Supplemental Course Evaluations for 1996 and 1997 (spring and fall semesters) (on
file with author).
68. In the spring 1996 (N=20) course, of 20 students who completed the narrative
evaluation, 18 students answered question number three, supra note 65, and 13 answered question
number four, supra note 65. Seventeen students answering question number three (or ninety-four
percent) made favorable comments about the book; but, of those students answering question
number four, only six (or forty-six percent) criticized some aspect of it or offered a suggestion for
improvement. Fifty-four percent, then, presumably did not find anything wrong with the text.
Moreover, seven of the 18 students answering question number three (or thirty-nine percent)
thought the text was either clear or easy to understand; and six (or thirty-three percent) said it
was informative or thorough. Supplemental Course Evaluation for 1996 (spring semester) (on file
with author).
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III. CONCLUSION
Despite its attractiveness and usefulness as a constitutional law
text, each volume of the O'Brien set shares two principal flaws from
a pedagogical perspective. The first flaw is that the texts fail to make
reference to judicial behavioralism, an important part of public law
scholarship. Students consulting the texts will learn, of course, that the
Supreme Court is a political institution. They will also realize that
constitutional interpretation is at the heart of defining the judicial
politics of the Court and its role in American democracy. Yet students
will have a hard time comprehending how political science is connected
to constitutional law because they are not exposed to how a formidable
group of political scientists (namely the more quantitatively inclined)
study the Court. Arguably, a more balanced perspective would present
at least some discussion (or more bibliographic references) about what
political science from a public law perspective represents, and how
empirically-based social scientists evaluate judicial behavior.
The second flaw, which is generally linked to the under-utilization
of legal research information, is one that Professor O'Brien already
seems to be partially aware of in the third edition. Like the vast
majority of casebooks on the market, the O'Brien texts need to
incorporate more material about how students can study Supreme
Court opinions and, significantly, how students can accomplish legal
research (especially with regard to Internet-based research and the use
of multimedia instructional techniques). Unless a particular instructor
makes an effort to acquaint students to this vital aspect of studying the
Supreme Court (either through in-class discussion or ordering
additional texts), the student is often clueless on how to proceed in
reading cases or researching what the Court does.
Appendices A and B reinforce why making changes to address
these two flaws would help students learn constitutional law. By
examining the competing theories of constitutional interpretation and
the exercise of judicial review in the beginning of each course, students
are acclimated to the general theme of what is "political" about the
Supreme Court. Still, without further instruction students have no
point of departure for grasping why (or how) political scientists choose
to study constitutional law, something that is typically perceived by
students as preeminently a "legal" topic. Nor can students compre-
hend what may be "scientific" about the political study of courts or
law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, students reading the
casebook will only see one methodological viewpoint (i.e. the author's)
when trying to appreciate what public law scholars do professionally.
1020 [Vol. 21:1003
Constitutional Law & Political Science
Although most reputable scholars (including Professor O'Brien) do not
purposefully try to indoctrinate students to a particular way of thinking
about the Court, omitting material that gives undergraduates a glimpse
of how social scientists study it unintentionally deprives them of the
chance to achieve a more sophisticated understanding of judicial
behavior.
A second issue concerns the extent to which a casebook should
devote space regarding "how to" read case opinions, conduct legal
research, or properly cite legal or nonlegal sources in a writing
assignment. While every professor handles this aspect of teaching
constitutional law differently, it would be helpful if the text assisted
undergraduates in learning those topics. In both of my constitutional
law courses, I require students to complete two "legal" research and
writing assignments, or "bench memos" (4-6 pages each). The
research papers, along with in-class participation through oral briefing
of the cases, account for a considerable portion of the final grade.
Because students have to read many cases, they must master the skill
of learning how to read efficiently and effectively. This reading skill
will enhance their academic performance on papers, examinations, and
quizzes. Knowing how to read cases and how to conduct legal
research, therefore, are integral parts of the course. Thus, it makes
sense that a constitutional law casebook should inform students where
to find legal reference material pertaining to the judicial process, how
it is organized, and how it should be cited in a written paper.
Moreover, because the Internet creates plenty of opportunities to
appreciate the study of law and courts, the casebook ought to include
extensive material on how to access and use it.
In summary, while the O'Brien casebooks are, on balance,
excellent teaching tools and student references in learning about
constitutional law from a traditional perspective, they ought to devote
more preliminary discussion to acquainting students with the concept
of how social scientists study public law generally and, in particular,
the manner in which legal scholars conduct legal research. Adding this
material might take constitutional law into areas typically reserved for
undergraduate Judicial Process (or even a Scope and Methods course)
or graduate legal study. Nevertheless, it still would help students to
understand how judicial behavior is an admixture of scientific, political,
and legal considerations. More significantly, adding this material
would give undergraduates a better chance to learn about the Court
and how political scientists uniquely play a role in teaching public law.
10211998]
Seattle University Law Review
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE SYLLABUS FOR SUPREME COURT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE (ADAPTED FROM FALL 1997)
I. COURSE DESCRIPTION, CLASS FORMAT, REQUIRED BOOKS
This course examines the constitutional interpretation of the
United States Supreme Court and the manner in which its politics
affects the decision making of the High Court and its relationship to
the more traditional "political" branches of government, like the
Congress and the Presidency. In the process, the political role of the
federal judiciary in American government is revealed, and the struggle
for political power between institutions is exposed. The fluidity of
judicial politics is studied in the context of understanding the nature
of federal judicial, legislative, and executive power; the separation of
powers principle; federalism; and electoral politics and representative
government. The format of the class is lecture and discussion. Some
video presentations and a visit to the law library are planned. In order
to facilitate class discussion, on certain days two or three students will
be asked (in advance) to prepare oral briefings of pertinent cases that
will be under review for that particular day's discussion. Students
giving oral briefs should be prepared to identify the case's holding and
its reasoning, along with being prepared to answer questions from the
professor or the students about the meaning and significance of the
case(s) under review.
Text(s) Required for Purchase:
1. O'Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. Vol. 1,
Struggles for Power and Governmental Accountability. 3d ed. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
2. O'Brien, David M. Supreme Court Watch: 1997. New York:
W.W. Norton, 1997.
3. Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the
President. 4th ed. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1997.
Recommended Text(s):
1. An inexpensive paperback law dictionary (available from any
general bookstore).
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II. EVALUATION OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Undergraduate students will be evaluated on the basis of academic
performance on quizzes, three examinations (inclusive of the final
examination), two short research papers ("bench memos"), attendance,
and class participation. Specifically:
In addition to performing the above class requirements applicable to
undergraduate students, graduate students taking the class must also
prepare a 10-15 page research paper on a topic selected by the student
in consultation with the professor by the end of the second week of
class. Completion of the paper is mandatory and constitutes 25% of
the final grade. For graduate students only, quizzes are optional and
do not have to be taken; if they are taken, they will not count towards
the final grade. Accordingly, for graduate students only, the first two
examinations are worth 10% each, for a total of 20%; the final
examination is 20%; the bench memos are worth 10% each, for a total
of 20%; the additional research paper is 25%; class participation is 10%;
and attendance is 5%.
(1) Quizzes 10%
(2) Two examinations 30%
(prior to final exam (15% each)
(3) Two short research papers 30%
(4-6 pages each, 15% each)
(4) Final examination 20%
(cumulative in part)
(5) Class attendance and oral briefing 10%
Total 100%
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III. USING THE INTERNET TO STUDY THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Internet boasts a wide variety of sources for learning about







See also "How to Locate Supreme Court Decisions and Other Law-
Related Materials on the Internet," pp. 177-178, in the O'Brien
casebook.
IV. SCHEDULE OF READINGS, TOPICS, AND COURSE
REQUIREMENTS
Week One: Introduction to the United States Supreme Court and
Constitutional Struggles.
CL & P, "The United States Constitution and Amendments," pp.
3-23.
CL & P, "Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,"
pp. 845-847.
CL & P, "Biographies of Current Justices," pp. 849-854, or
consult/review (for present composition and biographical information
on U.S. Supreme Court): http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/
fullcourt.html.
Fisher, Chapter 1, "Constitutional Struggles," pp. 1-21.
Week Two: Researching and Studying Constitutional Law.
CL & P, "Glossary," pp. 855-860 (skim only).
Handouts will be given out in class relating to this week's
material.
Note: A tour of the University of Akron Law Library is
scheduled.
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Week Three: Judicial Review and the Politics of Constitutional
Interpretation.
CL & P, Chapter 1, "The Supreme Court, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Politics," pp. 25-30; "Establishing and Contesting the
Power of Judicial Review," pp. 30-41; "James Kent's Introductory Law
School Lecture in 1794," pp. 41-44; "The Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798," pp. 44-48; "President Roosevelt's Radio
Broadcast, March 9, 1937," pp. 65-71. "The Politics of Constitutional
Interpretation," pp. 71-93.
Cases: Marbury v. Madison, pp. 48-58; Eakin v. Raub, pp. 59-65.
Reserve Reading: Hamilton, Federalist #78.
Quiz #1.
Week Four: Access Policy-Making of the United States Supreme Court.
CL & P, Chapter 2, "Law and Politics in the Supreme Court:
Jurisdiction and Decision-Making Process," pp. 96; "Jurisdiction and
Justiciable Controversies," pp. 97-121.
Cases: Flast v. Cohen, pp. 121-130; Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., pp. 130-
135; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, pp. 135-139; Baker v. Carr, pp.
139-153; Goldwater v. Carter, pp. 153-156.
SCW: pp. 3-11.
Reserve Reading: Banks, "The Supreme Court and Precedent: An
Analysis of Natural Courts and Reversal Trends."
Quiz #2.
Week Five: Inside (and the Impact o) the U.S. Supreme Court.
CL & P, "The Court's Docket and Screening Cases," pp. 159;
"The Rule of Four and Agenda-Setting," pp. 160-162; "Summarily
Decided Cases," pp. 162-163; "The Role of Oral Argument," pp. 163-
165; "Conference Deliberations," pp. 165-167; Inside the Court box,
p. 168; "Post Conference Writing and Circulation of Opinions," pp.
168-171; "Opinion Days and Communicating Decisions," pp. 171-172;
"The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions: Compliance and Imple-
mentation," pp. 172-191.
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Cases: Linkletter v. Walker, pp. 191-195; pp. 205-210; Griffith
v. Kentucky, pp. 195-198; Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners, pp.
199-201; Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Jeffrey Wasson, pp. 201-205.
SCW: pp. 11-18.
Quiz #3.
Week Six: The Supreme Court and the President I: Article II and the
Inherent Power of the President in Foreign Affairs.
Fisher, Chapter 8, "Treaties and Executive Agreements," pp. 225-
255; Chapter 9, "The War Power," pp. 256-294.
CL & P, Chapter 3, "Presidential Power, The Rule of Law, and
Foreign Affairs," pp. 211; "Office and Powers: The Two Presiden-
cies," pp. 211-215; "As Commander In Chief and In Foreign Affairs,"
pp. 215-219; "The Treaty-Making Power and Executive Indepen-
dence," pp. 232-234; "Constitutional History" box, p. 234; "War-
Making and Emergency Powers," pp. 246-250.
Cases: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, pp. 219-222;
Dames & Moore v. Regan, pp. 222-228; Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., pp. 228-232; Missouri v. Holland, pp. 235-240; United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, pp. 241-246; The Prize Cases, pp. 250-254;
Ex Parte Milligan, pp. 254-260; Korematsu v. United States, pp. 260-
270.
FIRST EXAMINATION.
Week Seven: The Supreme Court and the President II: The Chief
Executive's Authority over Domestic Affairs and the Appointing Process.
Fisher, Chapter 2, "Appointment Powers," pp. 22-48; Chapter 3,
"Theory in a Crucible: The Removal Power," pp. 49-86.
CL & P, Chapter 4, "The President as Chief Executive in
Domestic Affairs," pp. 276-281; "Inside the Court" box, p. 281;
"National Security and Inherent and Emergency Powers," pp. 285-289;
"Appointment and Removal Powers," pp. 308-312; "Constitutional
History" box, p. 313.
Cases: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, pp. 282-298;
New York Times Co. v. U.S., pp. 299-308; Myers v. United States, pp.
314-326; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, pp. 326-329; Bowsher
v. Synar, pp. 329-340; Morrison v. Olson, pp. 340-360.
SCW: pp. 19-24.
Quiz #4.
First bench memo paper is due.
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Week Eight: Legislative Powers and Political Accountability of the
President.
Fisher, Chapter 4, "Legislative Powers," pp. 87-118; Chapter 5,
"Vetoes: Presidential and Legislative," pp. 119, 119-141 (skim), 141-
159; Chapter 10, "Conclusions," pp. 295-303.
CL & P, Chapter 4, "Legislative Powers in the Administrative
State," pp. 360-363; "Accountability and Immunities," pp. 385-390;
"Constitutional History" box, pp. 390-391.
Cases: Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States, pp. 363-370;
Industrial Union Dep "t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, pp.
370-373; Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, pp. 373-
385; United States v. Nixon, pp. 391-398.
SCW: pp. 25.
Quiz # 5.
Week Nine: The Court and the Congress I: The Sources and Limita-
tions of Congress's Legislative Authority Under Article I.
Fisher, Chapter 6, "Power Over Knowledge: Seeking and
Withholding Information," pp. 160-195.
CL & P, Chapter 5, "Congress: Membership, Immunities, and
Investigatory Powers," pp. 402-409; "Membership and Immunities,"
pp. 420-425; "Investigatory, Contempt, and Impeachment Powers,"
pp. 435-439.
Cases: Powell v. McCormack, pp. 409-415; U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, pp. 415-423; Gravel v. United States, pp. 423-428;
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, pp. 429-432; Watkins v. U.S., pp.
439-448; Barenblatt v. United States, pp. 449-456; Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Committee, pp. 456-464; "Constitutional
History" box, pp. 470-471.
Quiz #6.
Week Ten: The Court and Congress II: Legislative and Commerce
Powers.
CL & P, Chapter 6, "Congress: Legislative, Taxing, and
Spending Powers," pp. 472-476; "Constitutional History" box, pp.
476-477; "The Classic View of Congress's Legislative Powers," pp.
478-482; "From Legal Formalism to the New Deal Crisis." pp. 503-
509.
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Cases: McCulloch v. Maryland, pp. 483-494; Gibbons v. Ogden,
pp. 494-503; U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., pp. 510-515; Hammer v.
Dagenhart, pp. 515-519.
Quiz # 7.
Week Eleven: The Court and Congress III: The New Deal and the Rise
of the Administrative State.
CL & P, Chapter 6, "From the New Deal Crisis to the Adminis-
trative State," pp. 519-523.
Cases: N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, pp. 525-
531; United States v. Darby Lumber Company, pp. 531-535; Wickard
v. Filburn, pp. 535-538; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
pp. 539-547; U.S. v. Lopez, pp. 547-561; Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, pp. 561-572.
SECOND EXAMINATION.
Week Twelve: Federalism I: The Regulatory Role of the States in the
Constitutional Democracy
CL & P, Chapter 7, "The States and American Federalism," pp.
592-599; "In Comparative Perspective" box p. 599-600; "States' Power
Over Commerce and Regulation," pp. 602-608.
Cases: Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia,
pp. 609-614; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, pp. 614-618; Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.; pp. 618-621; Maine v. Taylor, pp. 621-623;
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, pp. 623-626, 637-638; "The Development of
Law" boxes, pp. 627-637.
SCW: pp. 26.
Quiz #8.
Week Thirteen: Federalism II: The Tenth Amendment and Judicial
Federalism
CL & P, Chapter 7, "The Tenth Amendment and the States," pp.
638-645; "Judicial Federalism," pp. 667-672.
Cases: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, pp.
645-660; New York v. United States, pp. 660-667; Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, pp. 673-678; Cooper v. Aaron, pp. 678-682; Younger v. Harris,




Constitutional Law &. Political Science
SCW: pp. 26-42.
Second bench memo paper is due.
Week Fourteen: Representative Government and Electoral Politics I:
Voting Rights and Reapportionment.
CL & P, Chapter 8, "Representative Government, Voting Rights,
and Electoral Politics," pp. 711-713; "Representative Government and
The Franchise," pp. 714-723; "Voting Rights and The Reapportion-
ment Revolution," pp. 734-741; "Development of Law" box, pp. 805-
806.
Cases: South Carolina v. Katzenbach, pp. 723-730 (skim); "The
Development of Law," pp. 730-733; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, pp. 742-
744 (skim); Wesberry v. Sanders, pp. 744-752 (skim); Reynolds v. Sims,
pp. 752-758; Davis v. Bandemer, pp. 759-772 (skim); Shaw v. Reno, pp.
772-778; Miller v. Johnson, pp. 778-787; Bush v. Vera, pp. 778-799;
Shaw v. Hunt, pp. 799-805.
SCW: pp. 43-46.
Week Fifteen: Representative Government and Electoral Politics II:
Campaigns and Elections.
CL & P, Chapter 8, "Campaigns and Elections," pp. 806-813.
Cases: Buckley v. Valeo, pp. 813-824; FEC v. NCPAC, pp. 825-
828; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, pp.
829-833, "Development of Law" box, pp. 833-834; Rutan v. Republi-
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE SYLLABUS FOR SUPREME COURT AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES COURSE (ADAPTED FROM SPRING 1997)
I. COURSE DESCRIPTION, CLASS FORMAT, REQUIRED BOOKS
This course examines the United States Supreme Court and its
political decision making with respect to civil rights and liberties.
Subject areas include the substance of the U.S. Constitution, the
various legal interpretations of the Bill of Rights, the exercise of
judicial review, and the judicial politics of the Supreme Court. Specific
emphasis will be placed upon analyzing the cases of the Supreme Court
with regards to the protection of property rights; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the scope of certain criminal rights and
procedures; the nature of the right to privacy; and the meaning of
"equal protection of the laws." The format of the class is lecture and
discussion. A video presentation and a visit to the law library are
planned for the purpose of introducing students to the U.S. Supreme
Court and in order to acquaint students with the fundamentals of
conducting legal research. Also, in order to facilitate class discussion,
for most class meetings students will be asked to prepare oral briefings
of pertinent cases that will be under review for that particular day's
discussion. Students giving oral briefs should be prepared to identify
the case's holding and its reasoning, along with being prepared to
answer questions from the professor or the students about the meaning
and significance of the case(s) under review.
Text(s) Required for Purchase:
1. O'Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. Vol. 2, Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties. 2d ed. New York: W.W. Norton,
1994.
2. O'Brien, David M. Supreme Court Watch: 1996. New York:
W.W. Norton 1996.
Recommended Text(s):
1. Abraham, Henry J., and Barbara A. Perry. Freedom & The
Court: Civil Rights & Liberties in the U.S. 6th ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994.
2. An inexpensive paperback law dictionary and a style manual
(available from any trade bookstore).
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I. EVALUATION OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Undergraduate students will be evaluated on the basis of academic
performance on quizzes, three examinations (inclusive of the final
examination), two short research papers ("bench memos"), attendance,
and class participation. Specifically:
In addition to performing the above class requirements applicable to
undergraduate students, graduate students taking the class must also
prepare a 10-15 page research paper on a topic selected by the student
in consultation with the professor by the end of the second week of
class. Completion of the paper is mandatory and constitutes 25% of
the final grade. For graduate students only, quizzes are optional and
do not have to be taken; if they are taken, they will not count towards
the final grade. Accordingly, for graduate students only, the first two
examination are worth 10% each, for a total of 20%; the final examina-
tion is 20%; the bench memos are worth 10% each, for a total of 20%;
the additional research paper is 25%; class participation is 10%; and
attendance is 5%.
(1) Quizzes 10%
(2) Two examinations 30%
(prior to final exam (15% each)
(3) Two short research papers 30%
(4-6 pages each, 15% each)
(4) Final examination 20%
(cumulative in part)
(5) Class attendance and oral briefing 10%
Total 100%
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III. USING THE INTERNET TO STUDY THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The Internet boasts a wide variety of sources for learning about







IV. SCHEDULE OF READINGS, TOPICS, AND
COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Week One: Introduction to the United States Supreme Court.
CL & P, "The United States Constitution and Amendments,"
pps. 3-23.
CL & P, "Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,"
pps. 1521-1524.
Note: A videotape, entitled "This Honorable Court, Part I," will
be shown.
Recommended: CL & P, Chapter 2, "Law and Politics in the
Supreme Court: Jurisdiction and Decision-Making Process," pps. 97-
215 (skim only; and do not read the cases).
Abraham, Chapter 1, "Introduction," pps. 3-8.
Week Two: Researching and Studying Constitutional Law
CL & P, "Glossary," pps. 1525-1530 (skim only).
Handouts will be given out in class relating to this week's
material.
Note: A tour of the University of Akron Law Library is
scheduled.
Week Three: Judicial Review and the Politics of Constitutional
Interpretation.
CL & P, Chapter 1, "The Supreme Court, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Politics," pps. 24-29; "Establishing and Contesting the
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Power of Judicial Review," pps. 29-48; "The Politics of Constitutional
Interpretation," pps. 72-86; "In and Beyond the Text," pps. 87-93.
Cases: Marbury v. Madison, pps. 48-58; Eakin v. Raub, pps. 59-
63.
Reserve Reading: Brennan, William, "The Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment,"; Rehnquist, William, "The Notion of a
Living Constitution,"; Scalia, Antonin, "Originalism,"; Bork, Robert,
"Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law."
Quiz # 1.
Week Four: Economic Rights and the Problem of the 'Double Standard'
CL & P, Chapter 3, "Economic Rights and American Capital-
ism," pps. 216-217; "The Contract Clause and Vested Interests in
Property," pps. 218-221 [including 'Constitutional History' box]; "The
Development and Demise of a 'Liberty of Contract,"' pps. 252-264;
"The 'Takings Clause' and Just Compensation," pps. 287-290; "The
Development of Law," pps. 295-296.
Cases: Skim cases in Contract Clause section, from pps. 222-252);
The Slaughterhouse Cases, pps. 266-271; Munn v. Illinois, pps. 271-274;
Lochner v. N.Y, pps. 274-281; West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, pps. 281-
285; Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, pps. 290-294.
Reserve Reading: U.S. vs. Carolene Products Co. (1938).
SCW: pps. 31-45; 103-110.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 2, "The Double Standard,"
pps. 9-29.
Quiz # 2.
Week Five: Nationalization ('Incorporation') of the Bill of Rights and
the 'Due Process' Revolution.
CL & P, Chapter 4, "The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights,"
pps. 297-302; "The Selective Nationalization of Guarantees of the Bill
of Rights Plus Other Fundamental Rights," pps. 302-311 [including
'The Development of Law' and 'Constitutional History' boxes]; "The
Rise and Fall of the 'Due Process' Revolution," pps. 350-360
[including 'The Development of Law' box].
Cases: Barron v. Baltimore, pps. 311-313; Hurtado v. California,
pps. 314-318; Palko v. Connecticut, pps. 319-322; Adamson v.
California, pps. 322-327; Griswold v. Connecticut, pps. 332-343.
SCW: pps. 111-122.
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Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 3, "The Bill of Rights and Its
Applicability to the States," pps. 30-91.
Quiz #3.
Week Six: The First Amendment. General Principles of the Freedom of
Expression and Association.
CL & P, Chapter 5, "Freedom of Expression and Association,"
pps. 366-375; "Judicial Approaches to the First Amendment," pps.
376-383; pps. 408-412; "Freedom of Association," pps. 628-636.
Cases: Schneck v. United States, pps. 384-386; Gitlow v. New
York, pps. 386-391; Dennis v. United States, pps. 391-405; Branden-
burg v. Ohio, pps. 405-408; NAACP v. Alabama, pps. 637-640; Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, pps. 640-643.
SCW, pps. 123-125.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 5, "The Precious Freedom of
Expression," pps. 154-174; "Free Expression and Association and
Subversive Activity: The National Security Syndrome," pps. 190-200.
FIRST EXAMINATION.
Week Seven: Freedom of the Press.
CL & P, Chapter 5, "Freedom of the Press," pps. 535-540; 557-
560; "Fair Trial/Free Press Controversies," pps. 578-583.
Cases: Near v. Minnesota, pps. 541-544; New York Times Co. v.
U.S., pps. 544-553; Branzburg v. Hayes, pps. 560-567; Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., pps. 567-571; Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, pps.
583-590; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, pps. 590-593.
Recommended: Abraham, "Press Freedom and Fair Trial and
Prior Restraint," pps. 174-186.
First bench memo due.
Week Eight: Some Special Problems of Free Expression: Obscenity,
Offensive Speech, and Symbolic Speech
CL & P, Chapter 5, "Obscenity, Pornography, and Offensive
Speech," pps. 418-424; "Fighting Words and Offensive Speech," pps.
454-459; "Symbolic Speech and Speech-Plus Conduct," pps. 593-597;
"Speech-Plus Conduct," pps. 619- 623 [including 'The Development
of Law' box].
Cases: Miller v. California, pps. 432-438; N.Y v. Ferber, pps.
445-449; Cohen v. California, pps. 459-464; Bethel School District No.
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403 v. Fraser, pps. 472-477; West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, pps. 597-609; Texas v. Johnson, pps. 612-619.
SCW: xxx
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 5, "What is Obscene and
When Is It?," pps. 200-216; "Some Basic Concepts," pps. 164-174.
Quiz # 4.
Week Nine: Freedom of Religion: Establishment and Free Exercise.
CL & P, Chapter 6, "Freedom from and of Religion," pps. 644-
651; "The (Dis)Establishment of Religion," pps. 652-665; "Free
Exercise of Religion," pps. 746-755.
Cases: Everson v. Board of Education, pps. 665-673; Lemon v.
Kurtzman, pps. 685-693; Sherbert v. Verner, pps. 755-762; Oregon v.
Smith, pps. 767-777; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
pps. 777-787.
SCW, pps. 163-189.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 6, "Religion," pps. 220-234;
"Establishment: The Separation of Church and State," pps. 262-320;
"The Free Exercise of Religion," pps. 234-262.
Quiz #5.
Week Ten: The Rights of the Accused Under the Fourth Amendment:
Search and Seizure and Exceptions to the Warrants Requirement
CL & P, Chapter 7, "The Fourth Amendment Guarantee Against
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," pps. 787- 789; "Requirements for
a Warrant and Reasonable Searches and Seizures," pps. 790-794;
"Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement," pps. 802-810; "The Special
Problems of Automobiles in a Mobile Society," pps. 834-840;
"Wiretapping, Bugging, and Police Surveillance," pps. 881-887; "The
Exclusionary Rule," pps. 902-907.
Cases: Chimel v. California, pps. 795-798; Terry v. Ohio, pps.
813-818; U.S. v. Sokolow, pps. 819-824; Minnesota v. Dickerson, pps.
824-828; California v. Acevedo, pps. 852-858; Katz v. U.S., pps. 893-
897; Mapp v. Ohio, pps. 908-918; Nix v. Williams, pps. 918-924; U.S.
v. Leon, pps. 924-941.
SCW., pp. 190-192; 198-201.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 4, "The Fascinating World
of Due Process of Law," pps. 133-153.
SECOND EXAMINATION.
1998] 1035
Seattle University Law Review
Week Eleven: Other Substantive and Procedural Rights of the Accused:
The Protection Against Self-Incrimination, the Right to Counsel, The
Right of Confrontation, and Miscellaneous Constitutional Protections.
CL & P, Chapter 8, The "Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against
Self-Accusation," pps. 942-949; "Coerced Confessions and Police
Interrogations," pps. 951-960; Chapter 9, "The Rights to Counsel and
Other Procedural Guarantees," pps. 1019-1024; "Plea Bargaining and
the Right to Effective Counsel," pps. 1036-1041; "Indictment by
Grand Jury," pps. 1046-1047; "The Right to an Impartial Jury Trial,"
pps. 1047-1053; "Speedy and Public Trial," pps. 1073-1074; "The
Rights to Be Informed of Charges and to Confront Accusers," pps.
1074-1077; "The Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy," pps. 1078-
1081; "The Guarantee Against Excessive Bail and Fines," pps. 1082-
1085.
Cases: Miranda v. Arizona, pps. 961-974; Rhode Island v. Innis,
pps. 980-985; Duckworth v. Eagan, pps. 985-991; McNeil v. Wisconsin,
pps. 992-995; Arizona v. Fulminate, pps. 995-999; Withrow v.
Williams, pps. 999-1003; "The Development of Law," pps. 1004-1008;
Powell v. Alabama, pps. 1024-1027; Gideon v. Wainright, pps. 1027-
1032; Argersinger v. Hamlin, pps. 1032-1036.
SCW, pps. 202-205; 206-209.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 4, "The Fascinating World
of Due Process of Law," pps. 92-133.
Week Twelve: The Problem of 'Cruel and Unusual' Punishment in a
'Civilized' Society.
CL & P, Chapter 10, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment," pps.
1089-1091; "Noncapital Punishment," pps. 1091-1095; "Capital
Punishment," pps. 1100-1110; "The Development of the Law," pps.
1160-1167 (box).
Cases: Rummel v. Estelle, pps. 1095-1100; Furman v. Georgia,
pps. 1110-1122; Lockett v. Ohio, pps. 1122-1129; McCleskey v. Kemp,
pps. 1129-1144, Penry v. Lynaugh, pps. 1144-1152; Payne v. Tennessee,
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Week Thirteen: The Right to Privacy, Abortion, Personal Autonomy,
and the Right to Die
CL & P, Chapter 11, "The Right to Privacy," pps. 1168-1172;
"Privacy and Reproductive Freedom," pps. 1172-1183; "The Develop-
ment of Law," pps. 1199-1203 (box); "Privacy and Personal Autono-
my," pps. 1236-1244.
Cases: Roe v. Wade, pps. 1188-1199; Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, pps. 1208-1221; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, pps. 1221-1236; Bowers v. Hardwick, pps. 1244-
1253; Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, pps.
1253-1264.
SCW, pps. 216-219.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 8, "The 1973 Abortion
Decisions and Their Offspring," pps. 418-421.
Quiz # 7.
Second bench memo due.
Week Fourteen: Equal Protection of the Laws and Racial Discrimination
in Education.
CL & P, Chapter 12, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," pps.
1265-1273; "Racial Discrimination and State Action," pps. 1275-1291;
"Racial Discrimination in Education," pps. 1317-1327; "Inside the
Court," pps. 1333-1338; (boxes); "The Development of Law," pps.
1371-1373 (box).
Cases: Dred Scott v. Sanford, pps. 1292-1299; Civil Rights Cases,
pps. 1299-1309; Brown v. Board of Education I, pps. 1328-1333; Bolling
v. Sharpe, pps. 1338-1340; Brown v. Board of Education II, pps. 1340-
1345; Cooper v. Aaron, pps. 1344-1349; Freeman v. Pitts, pps. 1363-
1367; U.S. v. Fordice, pps. 1367-1367.
SCW, pps. 220-221.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 7, "Race-The American
Dilemma: The Evolving Equal Protection of the Laws," pps. 321-403.
Quiz # 8
Week Fifteen: Affirmative Action and Non-Racial Classification
Analysis
CL & P, Chapter 12, "Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimi-
nation," pps. 1373-1379; "The Development of Law," pps. 1401-1406
(box); "Inside the Court," pps. 1407-1409; "Nonracial Classifications
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and the Equal Protection of the Laws," pps. 1445-1448 [including
"Gender-Based Discrimination"]; "The Development of Law," pps.
1449-1451; "The Development of Law," pps. 1477-1478; "Wealth,
Poverty, and Illegitimacy," pps. 1478-1479; "The Development of
Law," pps. 1487-1488; "The Development of Law," pps. 1501-1503;
"Alienage and Age," pps. 1503-1506 [including 'The Development of
Law' boxes]; "Mental Illness and Retardation," p. 1516.
Cases: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, pps. 1380-
1401; Michael M. v. Superior Court, pps. 1464-1472; San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez, pps. 1488-1501; Plyer v. Doe,
pps. 1507-1516; Heller v. Doe, pps. 1516-1520.
SCW, pps. 221-235.
Recommended: Abraham, Chapter 8, "The Wrench of Affirma-
tive Action and Reverse Discrimination," pps. 421-437; "Gender and
Race Under the New Equal Protection," pps. 404-417.
